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ABSTRACT 
 
Today, many critical information systems have safety-critical and non-safety-
critical functions executed on the same platform in order to reduce design and 
implementation costs. The set of safety-critical functionality is subject to 
certification requirements and the rest of the functionality does not need to be 
certified, or is certified to a lower level. The resulting mixed-criticality systems 
bring challenges in designing such systems, especially when the critical tasks are 
required to complete with a timing constraint. This paper studies a problem of 
scheduling a mixed-criticality system with fault tolerance. A fault-recovery 
technique called checkpointing is used where a program can go back to a recent 
checkpoint for re-execution when errors are occurred. A novel schedulability test 
is derived to ensure that the safety-critical tasks are completed before their 
deadlines and the theoretical correctness is shown.   
 
KEYWORDS: Safety-critical certification; Mixed-criticality systems; Real-time 
scheduling; Fault-tolerance. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Modern computing systems can execute multiple applications of different criticality 
or importance, such as safety-critical and non-safety-critical, on a single platform. 
Criticality is a designation of the level of assurance against failure needed for a 
system component. In a mixed-criticality computing system, there are two or more 
distinct levels of criticality for executions of computing applications. Different 
standards of identifying levels of criticality have been established in different 
industries. ASILs (Automotive Safety and Integrity Levels) is a risk classification 
scheme defined by the ISO 26262 - Functional Safety for Road Vehicles standard. 
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DALs (Design Assurance Levels), which provides five categories of safety 
assurance levels, is determined from the safety assessment process and hazard 
analysis by examining the effects of a failure condition in a software system. SILs 
(Safety Integrity Levels), specifying a target level of risk reduction, is used as a 
measurement of performance required for a safety instrumented function (SIF).  In 
the functional safety standards based on the IEC 61508 standard, four SILs are 
defined. 
 
Systems with safety-critical functionality need to be certified for a permission to 
operate. The authors in [Baruah et al., 2012] discuss such a case for the design and 
validation processes of certain Unmanned Aerial Vesicles (UAV's). The 
functionalities on board such UAV’s may be classified into two levels of criticality: 
 
• Level 1: the mission-critical functionalities, concerning reconnaissance 
and surveillance objectives, like capturing images from the ground, 
transmitting these images to the base station, etc. 
• Level 2: flight-critical functionalities, to be performed by the aircraft to 
ensure its safe operation. 
The executions of these two levels of functionalities are controlled by an on-board 
computer and the tasks are executed continuously. Also, these tasks are real-time 
tasks that are required to provide responsiveness within a timely constraint or before 
a deadline. For examples, flight-control tasks are executed every certain time to 
control an aircraft's direction, altitude and airspeed in flight. If one of these tasks 
takes too long to complete, it may cause problems to control the aircraft. 
 
For permission to operate such UAV’s over civilian airspace (e.g., for border 
surveillance), it is mandatory that its flight-critical functionalities be certified 
correct by civilian Certification Authorities (CA’s) such as the US Federal Aviation 
Authority (FAA), which tend to be very conservative concerning the safety 
requirements. System designers ensure both mission-critical and flight-critical 
functionalities to be correct but the notion of correctness adopted in validating these 
functionalities is typically less rigorous than the one used by civilian CA’s. The 
CA's may require longer timing budgets reserved for the flight-critical tasks to 
execute than the ones used by the system designers, in order to ensure the aircraft's 
safety. A trade-off can be seen in this process. When the designers determine timing 
characteristics or timing budgets for running the functional tasks, they estimate the 
values from extensive experiments. By taking the estimates, all designed 
functionalities are performed successfully in most of the time but exceptions of 
executing over deadlines may not be guaranteed to be excluded. The more 
conservative estimate by the CA's can exclude missing execution deadlines to the 
greatest extent possible but it may cause a shortage of CPU time resource to 
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accommodate all of the flight-critical and mission-critical tasks onto the single 
system. Recently, how to overcome this conflict has become an increasing research 
trend [Burs and Davis, 2018].   
 
In executing computing tasks, faults or errors may happen during the process which 
can either produce incorrect results or cause real-time tasks to miss their deadlines. 
Permanent and transient faults are the two categories of errors that happen the most 
frequently. Permanent faults, such as hardware damage and shutdown, cannot be 
recovered. Transient faults, by contrast, can be recovered by re-executing the faulty 
task. A common example of transient fault is the inducing in memory cells of 
spurious values, caused by charged particles (e.g., alpha particles) passing through 
them [Krishna, 2014]. In computer systems transient faults occur much more 
frequently than permanent faults do [Castillo et al., 1982; Iyer and Rossetti, 1986]. 
Generally, there are two major techniques to recover transient faults, primary-
backup execution [Al-Omari et al., 2004] and checkpointing [Punnekkat et al., 
2001]. A backup is an exact copy of an execution of a task. A checkpoint is a 
regularly-saved state of a task, which consists of values of data variables and 
contents of system registers. An acceptance test that ensures the program's 
successful execution must be run before saving the necessary data. In the primary-
backup execution technique, the whole faulty task is re-executed where in the 
checkpointing technique a re-execution of the affected task is performed from the 
most recent checkpoint. 
 
In this work, we solve the certification problem in mixed-criticality systems from a 
perspective of scheduling. We work on a methodology that focuses on executions 
of mixed-criticality, real-time tasks and fault tolerance, particularly in using the 
technique of checkpointing. To the best of the author's knowledge, this is the first 
work that considers using checkpointing in scheduling mixed-criticality tasks. The 
rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next section discusses some preliminary 
and related works. Section 3 formally introduces the system model and problem 
definition. Then, a novel schedulability test condition for a set of mixed-criticality 
tasks with fault tolerance is derived. We also present an example to explain how to 
use the test condition. The last section summarizes and concludes the work. 
 
 
RELATED WORKS 
 
Different task models have been built to characterize an execution of a real-time 
task. In a periodic task, job instances arrive regularly with a fixed inter-interval. A 
job instance of a periodic task in general is required to complete before an arrival 
of the next instance. Tasks with irregular arrival intervals are called aperiodic tasks. 
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Aperiodic tasks that have a minimum inter-arrival time are called sporadic tasks. 
The first real-time scheduling paper was published in [Liu and Layland, 1973]. 
Since then, a tremendous number of works have been done in the field. In primarily, 
there are two types of real-time scheduling algorithms, static-priority and dynamic-
priority. In a scheduling process, tasks are assigned priorities which are used to 
determine their order in execution. In a static-priority algorithm, priorities are 
assigned off-line and do not change during run-time. In contrast, a dynamic-priority 
algorithm schedules the tasks based on their priorities assigned on-line. For 
examples, Earliest Deadline First (EDF) is a classical, dynamic-priority algorithm 
that always selects a task closest to its deadline to run. Rate Monotonic (RM) is a 
static-priority algorithm that assigns priorities to periodic tasks based on the lengths 
of their periods. Since a length of a period of a task does not change, the priority 
stays the same during the task's execution. In practice, static-priority algorithms are 
simpler to implement in an operating system and dynamic-priority algorithms are 
more complex to predict the scheduling outcomes. However, dynamic-priority 
algorithms generally have a better utilization of CPU time. For further information 
about real-time scheduling, please refer to the following texts [Cheng, 2002; Liu, 
2000; Krishna and Shin, 1997]. 
 
In the past several years, mixed-criticality systems became a very popular research 
topic in designing critical information systems. Computing tasks with different 
criticality sharing the same resource on a single hardware platform can reduce 
design and implementation costs. However, as we mentioned earlier, it also brings 
challenges to confirm the schedulability of these tasks. It is well-known that 
conventional scheduling methods cannot satisfactorily address these challenges and 
the mathematical intractability of solving these problems has been proved in 
[Baruah et al., 2012]. In the existing works such as those in [De Niz et al., 2009; 
Lakshmanan et al., 2010; Baruah and Vestal, 2008; Ekberg and Yi, 2012; Guan et 
al., 2011; Baruah et al., 2008; Baruah et al., 2010], tasks running on a mixed-
criticality system are classified into two categories, safety-critical or HI-criticality, 
and non-safety-critical or LO-criticality. A HI-criticality task may have two 
estimated execution times, one from the CA's certification, and another from the 
system designers. At the beginning, both LO-criticality and HI-criticality tasks are 
scheduled by using their shorter estimated timing budgets. Once a HI-criticality 
task uses out its timing budget without a completion, it signals that the execution 
times estimated by the system designers are not trustworthy. At this moment, all 
HI-criticality tasks are assumed to run with their longer execution times required 
by the CA's. Simultaneously, all LO-criticality tasks are dropped in order to keep 
the safety of executing those HI-criticality tasks successfully. 
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Mixed-criticality systems with fault tolerance are also explored in the research 
community. In [Pathan 2014], the authors design a schedulability test for using the 
primary-backup technique. In [Huang et al., 2014], the authors describe a method 
to convert the fault-tolerant problem into a standard scheduling problem in a mixed-
criticality system. In one of our earlier works, the EDF scheduling algorithm and 
the primary-backup technique are used to maximize the number of scheduled LO-
criticality tasks while all of the HI-criticality tasks are schedulable [Lin et al., 2015]. 
 
At the time of writing this paper, none of existing works has engaged in solving the 
problem of using the checkpointing technique. 
 
 
SYSTEM MODEL, PROBLEM DEFINITION AND 
SCHEDULABILITY TEST 
 
System Model and Problem Definition 
 
We consider that a mixed-criticality system consists of a set of N sporadic tasks T 
= {T1, T2, ..., TN} where consecutive instances of a task Ti arrive with a minimum 
inter-interval, denoted by Pi. In order to ensure the schedulability in the worst-case 
scenario, we assume that the instances of each task arrive with their maximum 
frequency. In other words, each task has an instance to complete for every Pi which 
is called a period of Ti. For each task, the value of the worst-case execution time 
(WCET) is significant due to the requirement of having no deadline violations. The 
time between each task instance’s arrival and its deadline is called a relative 
deadline. A relative deadline of Ti is denoted as Di where Di = Pi. There are two 
criticality levels in the system, LO or HI. A task is either a LO-criticality or a HI-
criticality task and its criticality is denoted by Xi, Xi{LO, HI}. For a HI-criticality 
task, it has two WCETs as Ci(LO) and Ci(HI) and a LO-criticality task may have a 
Ci(LO) only. It is assumed that Ci(HI) ≥ Ci(LO). When the system starts, all tasks 
may have an infinite sequence of instances to execute. Initially, all HI-criticality 
and LO-criticality tasks are scheduled using their C(LO)s and this stage is called a 
LO-criticality mode. During the execution, a HI-criticality task may be detected that 
its execution time exceeds its C(LO). At this point, it signals the system that the 
shorter WCETs are not trustworthy so all HI-criticality tasks will switch to use their 
C(HI)s immediately. The system is thus switched into a HI-criticality mode. All of 
the LO-criticality tasks are dropped from the execution in order to maintain the 
feasibility of executing the HI-criticality tasks. 
 
We also define the faults arrival pattern that is used in our analysis. There is no 
difficulty to understand that there is no solution that can accommodate unlimited 
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errors. In this work, we assume that there is a minimum inter-interval of Pf  between 
any two faults' arrival. The faults considered are transient faults which can be 
recovered by re-executing the faulty task. Checkpoints are used in recovering the 
faulty tasks from errors. A HI-criticality task may be checkpointed into mi(LO) 
segments in its Ci(LO)and mi(HI) segments in its Ci(HI), where mi(HI) ≥ mi(LO). 
The interval of each segment in the same task, denoted by Ii, is assumed to be the 
same except of the last segment (a WCET may not be divisible by an I). Also, we 
assume that there is no error happened during a creation of a checkpoint and an 
acceptance test. 
 
The problem we target to solve is formally defined as follows. Given a task-set of 
T, each task is defined as Ti = {Pi, Di, ri, Xi, Ci(LO), Ci(HI), mi(LO), mi(HI), Ii} in 
which ri is a unique integer that indicates a static priority of Ti. The smaller the 
integer, the higher priority it indicates. The tasks are scheduled using each task's 
static priority. Assuming that faults arrive between a minimum interval of Pf, 
determine the task-set's schedulability that all tasks are schedulable in a LO-
criticality mode and all HI-criticality tasks are schedulable when the system is 
switched to and in a HI-criticality mode. 
 
Schedulability Test 
 
Scheduling without Fault Tolerance 
In real-time scheduling, a standard response-time analysis is used to determine 
schedulability of a set of tasks using static priorities [Joseph and Pandya, 1986]. In 
a response-time analysis, each task's worst-case response time is calculated. A 
response time is defined as the time between a task’s arrival and its completion. If 
the worst-case response time of a task is smaller than or equal to the task's relative 
deadline, the task is schedulable. When calculating a task's response time, only the 
tasks with higher priority have impacts to it. The response time value Ri is obtained 
from the following formula (where C denotes the WCET and hpi denotes the set of 
tasks with priority higher than that of task Ti): 
 
 𝑅𝑖 = 𝐶𝑖 + ∑ (
𝑗ℎ𝑝𝑖
⌈
𝑅𝑖
𝑃𝑗
⌉ × 𝐶𝑗) 
(1) 
 
 
 
This is solved using standard techniques for solving recurrence relations. The 
recurrence calculation stops when Ri on both sides are equal. To determine a task 
set's schedulability, it can be done by calculating all tasks' response times in the set. 
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In [Baruah et al., 2011], the authors define three conditions that need to be satisfied 
in order to decide the schedulability for a mixed-criticality system: 
i. All tasks' response times are not larger than their relative deadlines by using 
their C(LO). 
ii. All HI-criticality tasks' response times are not larger than their relative 
deadlines by using their C(HI). 
iii. No HI-criticality tasks miss their deadlines during a switch from a LO-
criticality mode to a HI-criticality mode. 
In practice, it is possible that conditions i and ii are satisfied and condition iii is 
failed. This is because when a system switches its mode, some of the LO-criticality 
tasks may have been executed for a certain amount of time. As a result, it may cause 
some HI-criticality tasks to miss deadlines due to a lack of enough CPU time for 
the execution of C(HI) before their deadlines. We explain such a failure possibility 
by considering an example of a task-set as in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1. Example of a set of three mixed-criticality tasks 
 
Ti Xi ri Pi Di Ci(LO) Ci(HI) 
T1 LO 1 5 5 2  
T2 HI 2 6 6 2 3 
T3 HI 3 10 10 2 3 
 
By verifying the schedulability of the LO-criticality mode, it can replace the Ci in 
(1) by Ci(LO). That is: 
 
 𝑅𝑖
𝐿𝑂 =  𝐶𝑖(𝐿𝑂) + ∑ (⌈
𝑅𝑖
𝐿𝑂
𝑃𝑗
⌉ × 𝐶𝑗(𝐿𝑂))
𝑗ℎ𝑝𝑖 
 (2) 
 
Similarly, by verifying the schedulability of the HI-criticality mode, it can replace 
the Ci in (1) by Ci(HI) and exclude all LO-criticality tasks (hpiH denotes the set of 
HI-criticality tasks with priority higher than that of task Ti). 
 
 𝑅𝑖
𝐻𝐼 =  𝐶𝑖(𝐻𝐼) + ∑ (⌈
𝑅𝑖
𝐻𝐼
𝑃𝑗
⌉ × 𝐶𝑗(𝐻𝐼))
𝑗ℎ𝑝𝑖𝐻 
 (3) 
 
By using (2) and (3), the following can be obtained:  
𝑅1
𝐿𝑂 = 2, 𝑅2
𝐿𝑂 = 4 and 𝑅3
𝐿𝑂 = 10;  
𝑅2
𝐻𝐼 = 3 and 𝑅3
𝐻𝐼 = 6 
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Both conditions i and ii are satisfied. However, the schedule in Figure 1 shows that 
condition iii is violated. At time instant 10, T3 has used 2 time units as its C(LO) 
without a completion. It signals the system and the system is switched to a HI-
criticality mode. T1 is dropped and both T2 and T3 increase their WCETs to 3 
immediately. It can be seen that T3 misses its deadline during the mode switching. 
 
In [Baruah et al., 2011], it is shown that verifying the schedulability for condition 
iii is unlikely to be tractable in that all release patterns of all sporadic tasks would 
need to be tested. A sufficient but not necessary condition is proposed in the work 
(The response time used in condition iii is denoted as 𝑅𝑖
∗): 
 
 
𝑅𝑖
∗ =  𝐶𝑖(𝐻𝐼) + ∑ (⌈
𝑅𝑖
∗
𝑃𝑗
⌉ × 𝐶𝑗(𝐻𝐼))
𝑗ℎ𝑝𝑖𝐻 
+ ∑ (⌈
𝑅𝑖
𝐿𝑂
𝑃𝑘
⌉ × 𝐶𝑘(𝐿𝑂)) 
𝑘ℎ𝑝𝑖𝐿 
 
(4) 
 
The equation (4) not only counts the computation impact from the HI-criticality 
tasks with higher priority than the one of Ti, it also "caps" the interference from the 
LO-criticality tasks (the set of hpiL) because a mode switching must happen before 
𝑅𝑖
𝐿𝑂. 
 
Figure 1. A Schedule of three mixed-criticality task 
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Scheduling with Checkpoints 
We extend the work described in section 3.2.1 to recover faults by using 
checkpoints. Checkpoints separate an execution of a task into segments. It reduces 
the time required for a re-execution for errors, up to the length of each segment's 
interval. By using checkpoints, additional overhead has to be considered and it is 
not trivial [Punnekkat et al., 2001]. Before a checkpoint is created, an acceptance 
needs to be performed to ensure the result of the execution in the current segment 
to be correct. Then, the variable states and registers values are saved before it starts 
an execution for the next segment. We use O to denote the overhead of one 
acceptance test and one saving of the program states. For a WCET with m segments, 
the total overhead is m × O. This is from m - 1 times of creating the checkpoints 
plus one time of saving states at the beginning and one time of acceptance test at 
the final completion. When errors are detected in an acceptance test, it will bring 
an additional I + O time units to the execution time. The I is the segment interval 
for a re-execution and the O is for another time of saving states and acceptance test. 
Please note that we assume that two consecutive faults arrive with at least a 
separation of Pf  time units.   
 
To verify the LO-criticality schedulability with checkpoints: 
 
 
𝑅𝑖
𝐿𝑂 =  𝐶𝑖(𝐿𝑂) + 𝑂𝑖 × 𝑚𝑖
(𝐿𝑂) 
              + ∑ ⌈
𝑅𝑖
𝐿𝑂
𝑃𝑗
⌉ × (𝐶𝑗(𝐿𝑂) + 𝑂𝑗 × 𝑚𝑗(𝐿𝑂))
 𝑗  ℎ𝑝𝑖
 
             + ⌈
𝑅𝑖
𝐿𝑂
𝑃𝑓
⌉ 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑘  ℎ𝑝𝑖   {𝑖} (𝑂𝑘 + 𝐼𝑘) 
 
(5) 
 
The sum consists of three inclusions for the response time: Ti's computation time 
and checkpointing overhead, all higher-priority tasks' computation times and 
checkpointing overhead and the maximum re-execution time of the number of 
faults that can occur within 𝑅𝑖
𝐿𝑂.  
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Similarly, the following is derived to verify the HI-criticality schedulability with 
checkpoints: 
 
 𝑅𝑖
𝐻𝐼 =  𝐶𝑖(𝐻𝐼) + 𝑂𝑖 × 𝑚𝑖
(𝐻𝐼) 
             + ∑ ⌈
𝑅𝑖
𝐻𝐼
𝑃𝑗
⌉ × (𝐶𝑗(𝐻𝐼) + 𝑂𝑗 × 𝑚𝑗(𝐻𝐼))
 𝑗  ℎ𝑝𝑖𝐻
 
            + ⌈
𝑅𝑖
𝐻𝐼
𝑃𝑓
⌉ 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑘  ℎ𝑝𝑖𝐻  {𝑖} (𝑂𝑘 + 𝐼𝑘) 
 
(6) 
 
In order to verify the schedulability during a mode switching, we need to include 
the checkpointing overhead and total re-execution time for the faults from the HI-
criticality tasks and from the LO-criticality tasks before the switching. 
 
 𝑅𝑖
∗ =  𝐶𝑖(𝐻𝐼) + 𝑂𝑖 × 𝑚𝑖
(𝐻𝐼) 
           + ∑ ⌈
𝑅𝑖
∗
𝑃𝑗
⌉ × (𝐶𝑗(𝐻𝐼) + 𝑂𝑗 × 𝑚𝑗(𝐻𝐼))
 𝑗  ℎ𝑝𝑖𝐻
 
          + ⌈
𝑅𝑖
∗
𝑃𝑓
⌉ 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑘  ℎ𝑝𝑖𝐻  {𝑖} (𝑂𝑘 + 𝐼𝑘) 
          + ∑ ⌈
𝑅𝑖
𝐿𝑂
𝑃𝑞
⌉ × (𝐶𝑞(𝐿𝑂) + 𝑂𝑞 × 𝑚𝑞(𝐿𝑂)) 𝑞  ℎ𝑝𝑖𝐿  
          + ⌈
𝑅𝑖
𝐿𝑂
𝑃𝑓
⌉ 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑠  ℎ𝑝𝑖𝐿  {𝑖} (𝑂𝑠 + 𝐼𝑠) 
 
(7) 
 
By a more thorough analysis, it can be seen that there is an overlap in (7) between 
𝑅𝑖
∗ and 𝑅𝑖
𝐿𝑂. Because 𝑅𝑖
∗ includes 𝑅𝑖
𝐿𝑂 and 𝑅𝑖
∗ must be greater than 𝑅𝑖
𝐿𝑂, the number 
of faults that may occur by 𝑅𝑖
𝐿𝑂 counts two times. In fact, by 𝑅𝑖
𝐿𝑂, errors may occur 
in any task with higher priority, and after 𝑅𝑖
𝐿𝑂 we only need to count the faults from 
the HI-criticality tasks with higher priority. Thus, (7) can be revised and improved 
as: 
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 𝑅𝑖
∗ =  𝐶𝑖(𝐻𝐼) + 𝑂𝑖 × 𝑚𝑖
(𝐻𝐼) 
            + ∑ (⌈
𝑅𝑖
∗
𝑃𝑗
⌉ × 𝐶𝑗(𝐻𝐼) + 𝑂𝑗 × 𝑚𝑗(𝐻𝐼))
 𝑗  ℎ𝑝𝑖𝐻
 
           +  ⌊
𝑅𝑖
∗−𝑅𝑖
𝐿𝑂
𝑃𝑓
⌋ 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑘  ℎ𝑝𝑖𝐻  {𝑖} (𝑂𝑘 + 𝐼𝑘) 
           + ∑ (⌈
𝑅𝑖
𝐿𝑂
𝑃𝑞
⌉ × 𝐶𝑞(𝐿𝑂) + 𝑂𝑞 × 𝑚𝑞(𝐿𝑂)) 𝑞  ℎ𝑝𝑖𝐿  
           + ⌈
𝑅𝑖
𝐿𝑂
𝑃𝑓
⌉ 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑠  ℎ𝑝𝑖𝐿  {𝑖} (𝑂𝑠 + 𝐼𝑠) 
 
(8) 
 
The equations (5), (6) and (8) can be also used to determine the schedulability for 
using the primary-backup technique because the primary-backup technique is a 
special case of the checkpointing technique. In the primary-backup technique, the 
number of segments can be taken as 1 and the additional overhead for saving states 
and acceptance test is just one time of O. Each re-execution after errors are detected 
is equal to the length of the faulty task's WCET. There is another one time of O 
associated with each time of the re-execution. Thus, the equations (5), (6) and (8) 
can be modified to be using with the primary-backup technique as follows. 
 
 𝑅𝑖
𝐿𝑂 =  𝐶𝑖(𝐿𝑂) + 𝑂𝑖 
              + ∑ ⌈
𝑅𝑖
𝐿𝑂
𝑃𝑗
⌉ × (𝐶𝑗(𝐿𝑂) + 𝑂𝑗)
 𝑗  ℎ𝑝𝑖
 
             + ⌈
𝑅𝑖
𝐿𝑂
𝑃𝑓
⌉ 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑘  ℎ𝑝𝑖   {𝑖} (𝐶𝑘(𝐿𝑂) + 𝑂𝑘 ) 
(9) 
 
 
 𝑅𝑖
𝐻𝐼 =  𝐶𝑖(𝐻𝐼) + 𝑂𝑖 
              + ∑ ⌈
𝑅𝑖
𝐻𝐼
𝑃𝑗
⌉ × (𝐶𝑗(𝐻𝐼) + 𝑂𝑗)
 𝑗  ℎ𝑝𝑖𝐻
 
             + ⌈
𝑅𝑖
𝐻𝐼
𝑃𝑓
⌉ 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑘  ℎ𝑝𝑖𝐻  {𝑖} ((𝐶𝑗(𝐻𝐼) + 𝑂𝑘 ) 
(10) 
Journal of International Technology and Information Management  Volume 27, Number 3 2018 
©International Information Management Association, Inc. 2017 95         ISSN: 1941-6679-On-line Copy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑅𝑖
∗ =  𝐶𝑖(𝐻𝐼) + 𝑂𝑖 
           + ∑ ⌈
𝑅𝑖
∗
𝑃𝑗
⌉ × (𝐶𝑗(𝐻𝐼) + 𝑂𝑗)
 𝑗  ℎ𝑝𝑖𝐻
 
          +  ⌊
𝑅𝑖
∗−𝑅𝑖
𝐿𝑂
𝑃𝑓
⌋ 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑘  ℎ𝑝𝑖𝐻  {𝑖} (𝐶𝑘(𝐻𝐼) + 𝑂𝑘 ) 
          + ∑ ⌈
𝑅𝑖
𝐿𝑂
𝑃𝑞
⌉ × (𝐶𝑞(𝐿𝑂) + 𝑂𝑞) 𝑞  ℎ𝑝𝑖𝐿  
          + ⌈
𝑅𝑖
𝐿𝑂
𝑃𝑓
⌉ 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑠  ℎ𝑝𝑖𝐿  {𝑖} (𝐶𝑠(𝐻𝐼) + 𝑂𝑠 ) 
 
(11) 
 
A Demonstrative Example 
We demonstrate an example to show how to use the schedulability test condition 
we derived in this paper. Consider another task-set with three mixed-criticality tasks 
in Table 2. We show how to calculate the response-time for T3. 
 
Table 2. Example of a set of three mixed-criticality tasks with using 
checkpoints, Pf = 20. 
 
Ti Xi ri Pi Di Ci(LO) Ci(HI) mi(LO) mi(HI) Oi Ii 
T1 LO 1 100 100 15  3  1 5 
T2 HI 2 120 120 10 15 2 3 1 5 
T3 HI 3 140 140 25 40 5 8 1 5 
 
The following calculation is to determine whether or not T3 is schedulable in the 
LO-criticality mode (verifying condition i). 
 
𝑅3
𝐿𝑂 = 25 + 5 + 15 + 3 + 10 + 2 = 60  
𝑅3
𝐿𝑂 = 25 + 5 + ⌈
60
100
⌉ × 18 + + ⌈
60
120
⌉ ×12 + + ⌈
60
20
⌉ × 6 = 78 
𝑅3
𝐿𝑂 = 25 + 5 + ⌈
78
100
⌉ × 18 + + ⌈
78
120
⌉ ×12 + + ⌈
78
20
⌉ × 6 = 84  
𝑅3
𝐿𝑂 = 25 + 5 + ⌈
84
100
⌉ × 18 + + ⌈
84
120
⌉ ×12 + + ⌈
84
20
⌉ × 6 = 90  
𝑅3
𝐿𝑂 = 25 + 5 + ⌈
90
100
⌉ × 18 + + ⌈
90
120
⌉ ×12 + + ⌈
90
20
⌉ × 6 = 90  
𝑅3
𝐿𝑂 = 90 
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The calculation above is explained as follows. Because T1's and T2's priorities are 
higher than T3's, T1 and T2 are executed before T3 when all of them start at time 
instant 0. The calculation starts by adding all of the three tasks' C(LO)s and the time 
overhead used to create the checkpoints, which is equal to 60. The recurrence 
calculation continues by including the higher priority tasks' C(LO)s, checkpointing 
costs and the execution time for the maximum number of re-execution segments, 
until at time instant 90 the total execution demand does not increase (both sides are 
equal). According to the formula (5), 𝑅3
𝐿𝑂 = 90. 𝑅3
𝐻𝐼 is calculated similarly by 
considering HI-criticality tasks only as defined in the formula (6). 
 
𝑅3
𝐻𝐼 = 40 + 8 + 15 + 3 = 66  
𝑅3
𝐻𝐼 = 40 + 8 + ⌈
66
120
⌉ × 18 + ⌈
66
20
⌉ × 6 = 90 
𝑅3
𝐻𝐼 = 40 + 8 + ⌈
90
120
⌉ × 18 + ⌈
90
20
⌉ × 6 = 96 
𝑅3
𝐻𝐼 = 40 + 8 + ⌈
96
120
⌉ × 18 + ⌈
96
20
⌉ × 6 = 96 
𝑅3
𝐻𝐼 = 96 
 
Since 𝑅3
∗ must be greater than 𝑅3
𝐿𝑂and 𝑅3
𝐻𝐼, 𝑅3
∗  is initialized to be the greater one 
between 𝑅3
𝐿𝑂and 𝑅3
𝐻𝐼, so 𝑅3
∗ starts at 96. The following shows the calculation 
process of 𝑅3
∗ based on the formula (8). 
 
𝑅3
∗ = 40 + 8 + ⌈
96
120
⌉ × 18 +  ⌊
96−90
20
⌋ × 6 + ⌈
90
100
⌉ × 18 +  ⌊
90
20
⌋ × 6 = 114 
𝑅3
∗ = 40 + 8 + ⌈
114
120
⌉ × 18 +  ⌊
114−90
20
⌋ × 6 + ⌈
90
100
⌉ × 18 +  ⌊
90
20
⌋ × 6 = 120 
𝑅3
∗ = 40 + 8 + ⌈
120
120
⌉ × 18 +  ⌊
120−90
20
⌋ × 6 + ⌈
90
100
⌉ × 18 +  ⌊
90
20
⌋ × 6 = 120 
𝑅3
∗ = 120 
 
By the above calculation, all of the calculated 𝑅3
𝐿𝑂, 𝑅3
𝐻𝐼 and 𝑅3
∗ are not larger than 
T3's relative deadline D3 which is 140, so T3 is schedulable. The schedulability tests 
of T1 and T2 use the same technique and we omit the details for the sake of avoiding 
a lengthy paragraph. In fact, both T1 and T2 are schedulable and hence the task-set 
is schedulable. 
 
 
SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORKS 
 
Checkpointing is a widely used technique for fault-tolerant computing. This paper 
solves the problem of applying checkpointing for scheduling mixed-criticality 
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tasks. A new sufficient schedulability test condition is derived and its theoretical 
correctness is shown along with the derivation.  
 
In the example shown in section 3.2.3, it is apparently that T3 is not schedulable by 
using the primary-backup technique. This is because when Pf = 20, errors can occur 
in every execution of T3. In the worst case there are two errors occurred in every 
instance of T3. Considering that every time T3 needs to restart the whole execution 
for an error, a T3 instance will never complete its execution by its deadline. It is 
seen that for tasks un-schedulable upon using a complete re-execution, it is possible 
to make the tasks schedulable by using checkpoints. Our future works include 
optimization techniques for the placement of checkpoints in scheduling mixed-
criticality tasks. 
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